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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUTHS. H1LTSLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 19145

HALLALENE M. RYDER,
Defendant- Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant appeals from judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
granting a $4,924.66 judgment in favor of Plaintiff personally
and determining that Money Market Certificates or savings qeposits
amounting to $33,623.43, and an investment of $10,000.00 in
Defendant's condo, were assets of Etta Wood, a deceased sister of
the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court from a judgment in favor
of Plaintiff as to $4,924.66 and determining that other assets
had been disposed of bv the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley during
his lifetime which belonged to his deceased sister, Etta Wood,
Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the jl>dgment and an award
uf all monies ordered by the court paid to Plaintiff and the heirs

uf Etta Wc'od.

Plain::iff requests that the judgment be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff in the case is Ruth Hiltsley as the Personal
Representative of the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley and in her
own behalf as the surviving widow.
During the trial of the case before Judge Croft, there was
introduced in evidence a journal kept by Milton J. Hiltsley during
his lifetime and in his own handwriting.

It is Exhibit 10-P.

It was used by all parties and accepted without objection for
its content by the court.

An entry at Page 253 of Exhibit 10-P

contained the following 12nguage:
Received money from Etta's account, transferred to
Salt Lake from Albuquerque, New Mexico, $30,000 plus
$314, a shortage of $8.00 plus.
The entry also contains the following language:
Placed $10,000 in savings passbook.
Placed $10,000
in money market at Am Savings, $10,000 in money market
at PFS.
Certificates of deposit and Money Market Certificates were
introduced to trace through the disposition of the $30,000.00
that was received on the 5th of October, 1979.

Judge Croft,

in an extensive and carefully written Memorandum Decision
(Tr. 38-55), traced the various sums from the Etta Wood original
deposits into Account No.

ll-013277-9 at American Savings.

This

account was originally in the name of M. J. Hiltsley and Ruth S.
Hiltsley.

It was opened on February 14, 1980.

It was closed on

August 25, 1981, the day before Milton J. Hiltsley died.

A

certificate was issued August 25, 1981 in the name of M. J.
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Hiltsley and Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder, with an opening
amount of $15,259. 78.
Defendant made no claim to any of the proceeds in the
account prior to the date that it was opened in her name and
the deceased on August 25, 1981.

Court found that this initial

deposit at American Savings & Loan of $10,000.00 came from the
Etta Wood transferred funds.
The court traced $10,000.00 from Etta Wood into Account
No.

715-101422-2 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, originally

in the name of M. J. Hiltsley alone, and was eventually traced
to Money Market Certificate No. 11647 issued on February 25, 1981
in the face amount of $17,000.00 to M. J. Hiltsley and Hallalene
Ryder as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

This Money

Market Certificate was found in the home of Plaintiff following
the death of M. J. Hiltsley.

It was claimed by Defendant Ryder

under an Affidavit and Guarantee for Lost Evidence of Account
(Ex. 30-P).

Through this document, Defendant caused Prudential

Federal Savings

& Loan to issue a new savings account,

No. 003-300723-6 (Ex. 32-P), in the name of Hallalene Ryder and
W. Fred Hansen as joint tenants.

Neither Ryder nor Hansen claimed

any interest in the funds at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
prior to the issuance on February 25, 1981 of the Money Market
Savings Certificate.
An additional account at American Savings

& Loan

Association

is Account No. 1-048466, which contained Etta Wood funds.

It was
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Exhibit 40-D supplied by Defendant shows the sums that
she contributed to the purchase price of the condominium.
checks to close out this balance are exhibits.

Two

They are

Exhibit 20-P and Exhibit 21-P. Neither of the checks was endorsed
by Plaintiff, though made payable to her.

Exhibit 21-P was

payable to all three, the Hiltsleys and H. M. Ryder.

The Court

determined that Ruth Hiltsley was a tenant in common in the
proceeds in American Savings
(Ex. 5-P).

& Loan

as shown by the passbook

He gave the Defendant credit for all sums that she

deposited into the account, held that the $10,000.00 item was an
asset of the heirs of Etta Wood, and then divided the difference
between the tenants in common, M. J. Hiltsley and Ruth S. Hiltsley
since Ruth Hiltsley did not endorse the checks on the condo, and
awarded her the judgment for $4,924.66, her undivided one-half.
Plaintiff submits that there can be no question about the accuracy
and the propriety of the award to the heirs of Etta Wood and
Ruth Hiltsley of the sums that are invested in the Defendant's
condo.
Etta Wood died on the 20th of January, 1980 (Ex. 10, pg 2481
The record of M. J. Hiltsley shows that $10,000.00 in money market
at American Savings
(Ex. 10, pg 253).

& Loan

was invested out of her $30,000.00

The records at American Savings & Loan show

an account opened on the 14th of February, 1980 in the amount of
$12,000.00, Account No. 11-013277-9, is referred to on the Money
Market Certificate (Ex. 4-P) in the face amount of $15,259. 78.
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ThP. account was changed into the name of M. J. Hiltsley
and Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder on the 25th of August, 1982 as
shown by Exhibit 19-P.
died.

This was the day before M. J. Hiltsley

Court found that this account contained the $10,000.00

of Etta Wood, money referred to in the ledger as being invested
in the Money Market Certificate at American Savings & Loan.
This is one of the items that the trial court held to bP. an asset
of the estate of Etta Wood and the property of her heirs.
The documents support in every way the finding of the Court.
There was no contrary evidence, and Defendant makes no claim that
she in any way contributed to the American Savings & Loan Account
No. 11-013277-9 represented by the Money Market Certificate.
Two accounts are shown to have been at Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan.

One account in the name of M. J. Hiltsley and

Ha1lalene Ryder was opened on the 19th of July, 1979 and paid out
on the 16th of July, 1981.
22-P and 23-P.

This account is shown by Exhibits

The account predates the receipt by M. J. Hiltsley

of the Etta Wood assets and the payment does not correspond to
any of the payments that are material to disposition of this
matter.

Court held that this item was not involved in the Etta

Wood estate or gave no interest in it to the Plaintiff.

What

happened to the money upon payment is not known.
ThP. other account was opened at Prudential Federal Savings

& Loan on the 22nd of February, 1980 (R. 24-P) in the name of
M. J. Hiltsley only.

It was closed on the 28th of August, 1980
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It seems clear to me that Milton must be considered
as having received that $30,000.00 in trust for Etta
and this money was not his money to invest as he did
and did not become his upon her death to give away
or use for his own purposes.
It is thus apparent
that at least $10,000.00 in each of the three accounts
mentioned came from Etta's funds.
It is supported by clear, convincing and undisputed evidence.
The finding by the Court would classify Milton J. Hiltsley
as a "conscious wrongdoer".

This court has held in Park v. Zions

First National Bank, et al, filed September 22, 1983, that such
a wrongdoer may be held to restore the fund diverted and also
pay all profits.

The language of the court seems especially

fitting in the facts of the present case:
Where a person by the consciously wrongful disposition
of the property of another acquires other property, the
person whose property is so used is not only entitled
to hold the wrongdoer personally liable for the value
of the property wrongfully disposed of but he is entitled
as an alternative to the property so acquired.
If the
property so acquires is or becomes more valuable than
the property used in acquiring it, the profit thus made
by the wrongdoer cannot be retained by him; the person
whose property was used in making the profit is entitled
to it.
Restatement of Restitution Section 202
colIID1ent c (1937).
The reasoning behind this rule has been stated thus:
If, however, the wrongdoer were permitted to keep the
profit, there would be an incentive to wrongdoing,
which is removed if he is compelled to surrender the
profit. The rule which compels the wrongdoer to bear
any losses and to surrender any profits operates as a
deterrent upon the wrongful disposition of the
property of others.
The Personal Representative of Milton J. Hiltsley is
vitally interested in retrieving the property diverted from Etta

-13-

Wood's estate since the estate is liable for such diversion.
POINT II
DEFENDANT NOW HAS COLOR OF TITLE TO ASSETS OF PLAINTIFF
AND ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD.
It is undisputed that there are assets to which Defendant
presently has title and on which the court has determined a trust
should be imposed in favor of the heirs of Etta Wood.
The Probate Code of the State of Utah, UCA 75-3-101,
provides that upon the death of a person, his real and personal
property devolves to his heirs.

Upon the death of Etta Wood,

the property that she owned then devolved to her heirs.
It is undisputed that the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley did
not distribute the property received from Etta Wood to her heirs
and did not make any attempt whatever to probate the estate of
Etta Wood.
UCA 75-1-106, entitled "Effect of Fraud and Evasion",
provides that if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the
provisions or purposes of the Probate Code, any person injured
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator
of the fraud or restitution from any person other than a bona fide
purchaser benefiting from the fraud, whether innocent or not.
It is apparent that the Probate Code is intended to provide
relief to people who are in the position of Plaintiff or who are
in the position of the heirs of Etta Wood.

-14-

As has been set out in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment of the court (Tr. 86-98), the mechanism for
recognizing the interest of the heirs of Etta Wood was that the
assets should be paid to the Personal Representative of Etta
Wood.

The alternative method proposed by Plaintiff at the trial

level (Tr. 69-85) was a judgment in favor of the Personal
RPpresentative of Milton J. Hiltsley and a trust imposed on the
proceeds for the benefit of the heirs of Milton J. Hiltsley.
This proposal was objected to by the Defendant, who now appeals
from the decision to give a direct judgment rather than impose a
trust on the asset in the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley.
An ultimate effect of the procedures followed by the court

or as proposed by Plaintiff would be the same.

As the court now

knows, there has been a Personal Representative appointed for the
estate of Etta Wood and motion filed by Plaintiff's attorney to
join the estate of Etta Wood in this action.
As Plaintiff reads the brief of Defendant, it is an
objection to the court determining that there are assets subject
to a trust in the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley which are in
possession under claim of title by Defendant.

A modification of

the order of the court giving a direct judgment to the Personal
RPpresentative of Milton J. Hiltsley, then imposing a trust on
the assets in favor of the estate of Etta Wood, should be a
simple matter for this Court to order if that result is ciPemed
appropriate.

-15The Findings and Conclusions of the trial court that the
assets handled by deceased M. J. Hiltsley are trust assets, are
supported by uncontroverted, substantial evidence.
submits the evidence is undisputed.

Plaintiff

Certainly relitigation or

retrial of this matter is not an efficient or necessary result
which should be ordered by this Court.
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM ATTEMPTING TO RELITIGATE THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE ASSETS RECEIVED FROMM. J. HILTSLEY
BY D0CTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
Defendant, in the trial of the matter, had every opportunity
to litigate the question of the source of the assets

that

ultimately came into her possession and on which she had a
record title.

There is no claim that she made any contribution

to the assets or that there were any of her assets commingled
with the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff or the determination
that there was a trust on the assets handled by M. J. Hiltsley
which he received from his deceased sister, Etta Wood.
had every opportunity to present any evidence of her interest in
the assets or any evidence she might have relating to the use
by M. J. Hiltsley of the assets of Etta Wood.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence of
any kind that the assets that were ultimately used and which
came into the hands of Defendant were not assets of the estate
of Etta Wood.

The $4,900.00 judgment that Plaintiff obtained
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by reason of her tenancy in common relationship in the savings
account at American Savings & Loan is clearly supported and
undisputed and legally unassailable.
Clearly the law is that one tenant in common cannot dispose
of another tenant in common's asset without the nonparticipating
tenant in common consenting or being willing that her asset be
used.

It seems relatively undisputed that the Plaintiff, in her

personal right, is entitled to a judgment of the $4,900.00
interest in the condominium of Defendant.
As to the balance of the bank accounts, having had an
opportunity to litigate and to present all evidence available on
the ownership of the assets in her possession and on which she
has record title, Defendant i8 now barred from relitigating this
issue by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
This Court,

in a series of recent cases, has clearly and

carefully set down the manner in which the doctrine of equitable
estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that have been
litigated in a trial proceeding.
Insurance Co., Utah,

635 P.2d 417,

In Wilde v. Mid-Century
this Court states the doctrine

in the following language:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel governs the
resolution of the issues in this case.
The purpose
of that doctrine is to prevent the relitigation of
issues which a party has once actually litigated.
As the doctrine was originally formulated, it
required thal the parties be the: sdme in the: first
and second
Mu:uali:
of parties is
no longer essenti<:Jl, howe':ter
T is .:urisJicci,,n,
following the la!1dmark Jecisi,m P EcrnhcirJ \". !:Link
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of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 19 Cal.2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), dispensed with mutuality
in collateral estoppel cases.
Searle Bros. v. Searle,
Utah, 588 P.2d 689 (1978).
Court set down the principles involved and necessary for the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in the following language:
(2,3) To invoke the doctrine, it must be demonstrated
(1) that the issue decided in the previous action
was identical to that tried in the subsequent action;
(2) that the issue was decided in a final judgment on
the merits; and (3) that the issue in the first case
was competently, fully, and fairly litigated by the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked.
Searle Bros.
v. Searle, Utah, supra, at 691.
See also Teitelbaum
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 25
Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962).
If these conditions
are met, the party against whom the original judgment
was rendered is bound, and so are those in privity
with that party.
There has been an argument made in the past that a party
not a litigant could not be bound by the doctrine of equitable
estoppel since the party would not be objecting to the findings
of the court had the issues been decided against such a party,
and that the doctrine of mutuality prevents such a party from
taking advantage of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
In a subsequent case, the court again adhered to and
upheld the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and specifically
indicated the manner in which that doctrine works as far as
parties who are strangers to a judgment and are the prevailing
party.

In Nielson v. Droubay, Utah, 652 P.2d 1293, the court

made the following holding:
[2,3)
In this jurisdiction we have abandoned the
rule requiring mutuality of parties in collateral
estoppel cases.
The established rule is that a

-18-

stranger to a judgment may assert a judgment against
one who actually litigated an issue and was
necessarily precluded by the judgment and thereby
preclude the relitigation of the same issue.
Searle Brothers v. Searle, supra, Richards v. Hodson,
26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971).
However, the
converse is not true.
One who has litigated an issue
may not assert a favorable judgment against another
who did not have an opportunity to litigate the issue.
Ruffinengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978);
State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962).
Because the Droubays were not parties to the Equitable
action, the judgment in that case does not preclude
the litigation of their claim that the option was
exercised.
See also Schaer v. State, by and through Utah Department
of Transportation, Utah, 657 P.2d 1337.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied in the
facts and circumstances before the Court in this matter, would
and should not require relitigation.

The parties present are

bound b;r the determination made by the trial court.
The trust which was found by the Court to exist can easily
be imposed upon the assets in the hands of the Personal
Representative of Milton J. Hiltsley; or if the Court considers
it necessary to place the assets in a properly appointed Personal
Representative for the estate of Etta Wood, such an entity now
exists as the record in this appellate proceeding demonstrates.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff

submits that the findings of the trial court

are so substantially and clearly supported by the evidence that
the findings should be affirmed on this appeal, that such orders
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as are necessary to prevent relitigation should be made and
fashioned by this Court, that with said modifications the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and Plaintiff
should be awarded her costs herein on this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

day of October, 1983.

